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Abstract 
On a now orthodox view, humans and many other animals are 
endowed with a “number sense”, or approximate number system 
(ANS), that represents number. Recently, this orthodox view has 
been subject to numerous critiques, with critics maintaining either 
that numerical content is absent altogether, or else that some 
primitive analog of number (‘numerosity’) is represented as opposed 
to number itself. We distinguish three arguments for these claims – 
the arguments from congruency, confounds, and imprecision – and 
show that none succeed. We then highlight positive reasons for 
thinking that the ANS genuinely represents numbers. The upshot is 
that proponents of the orthodox view should not feel troubled by 
recent critiques of their position. 
Keywords: number sense; numerosity; approximate number 
system; analog magnitude system. 
Introduction 
On a now orthodox view, humans (and many non-human 
animals) possess a primitive and pre-linguistic capacity to 
represent number. This is sometimes referred to as our 
“number sense” (Dehaene, 1997).   
At the heart of this theory lies the postulation of an 
approximate number system (ANS). This is a well-studied 
psychological system that enables organisms to efficiently 
intuit gross numerical quantities. It’s not perfect. Most 
notably, its performance conforms to Weber’s Law. So, while 
the ANS enables organisms to intuit (sometimes quite large) 
numerical quantities, ANS-governed numerical 
discriminations remain imprecise and ratio sensitive. 8 is 
easier to discriminate from 10 than 10 is from 12. Conversely, 
8 is discriminated from 10 as easily as 16 is discriminated 
from 20. In each case, absolute difference in number has little 
effect on performance: it is the ratio between sets which 
matters (the further from 1:1 the better).  
It bears emphasizing that the postulation of an ANS has 
proven extremely productive. Countless studies have served 
to support its existence, with the postulation of an ANS 
generating empirical predictions that have been borne out 
repeatedly in carefully controlled experiments (for reviews, 
see Anobile, Cicchini & Burr, 2019; Odic & Starr, 2018). In 
spite of this, there has been growing discontent with the 
suggestion that humans (and other animals) possess an ANS 
which genuinely represents number. Instead, critics have 
argued that (strictly speaking) the relevant systems/processes 
merely represent non-numerical magnitudes, like size and 
density, or primitive analogs of number (like “numerosity”). 
Either way, critics have denied that number is literally 
represented by an ANS, thereby calling the number sense 
theory into question.  
In the present treatment, we address these critiques. We 
begin by distinguishing three arguments that have motivated 
scepticism about the ANS, and its capacity to represent 
number, and show that none succeed. We then highlight 
positive, and previously unarticulated, reasons for thinking 
that the ANS genuinely represents numbers. The upshot is 
that proponents of a number sense should not feel troubled by 
recent critiques of their position. 
 
The ANS 
To begin, let us consider a tiny sample of the many studies 
that have purported to show that humans possess an ANS 
with genuine numerical content. To be clear, it is the 
interpretation of these studies that is at issue in this paper. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to have some evidence in view 
before considering the skeptic’s critiques.  
One particularly important source of evidence emerged 
in the early 2000s, when studies yielded evidence that young 
human infants could track the numerical properties of large 
sets, albeit imprecisely and in accord with Weber’s Law. For 
instance, Xu and Spelke (2000) habituated six-month-old 
infants to seen arrays containing either 16 or 8 dots. When 
habituated to an 8-dot array, infants recovered interest when 
presented with a 16- or 4-dot array, but not a 12-dot array. 
Meanwhile infants who were habituated to a 16-dot array 
would dishabituate to a 32- or 8-dot array, but not a 24-dot 
array. Since obvious confounds were controlled for, these 
findings were interpreted as showing that six-month-old 
infants can represent and discriminate the approximate 
number of items in large sets provided they differ by a 
suitably large ratio (e.g. 1:2). Subsequent studies then 
suggested that these basic discriminative capacities persist 
and improve into development. For instance, nine-month-old 
infants were found to reliably discriminate numerical 
quantities in comparable tasks provided these differed by a 
ratio of just 2:3 (Wood & Spelke, 2005), with adult humans 
pre-attentively discriminating numerical quantities with 
tighter ratios still (Halberda, Ly, Wilmer, Naiman & 
Germine, 2012). In each case, performance decreases as the 
numerical ratio nears 1:1, irrespective of precise cardinal 
values. 
Cross-modal studies bolster the suggestion that these 
results reflect a genuine sensitivity to number or numerical 
quantity. In one study, Izard, Sann, Spelke and Steri (2009) 
even found neonates capable of matching numerical 
quantities across modalities – i.e. matching a number of seen 
items with a number of heard sounds in a sequence of tones. 
Note that studies of this sort complicate attempts to explain 
the preceding results in terms of non-numerical confounds. 
After all, neonates in Izard et al.’s study could not have relied 
on (say) the size of the dots, or the total area of the seen set, 
when identifying a match, since properties of this sort could 
not have been heard. In this way, cross-modal studies support 
the conclusion that even pre-linguistic infants are genuinely 
sensitive to numerical quantities. And, since their failures 
were (again) a function of ratio, these results implicate a 
system with the performance profile of an ANS as outlined 
above.  
Of course, infants are notoriously difficult to study, 
requiring the use of indirect measures such as looking time. 
But preschoolers can be directly asked which of two stimuli 
has “more” dots or tones, and since they’re still too young to 
reliably count, they use their ANS to answer. For instance, 
Barth, La Mont, Lipton and Spelke (2005) found not only that 
preschoolers could reliably answer which of two visual 
stimuli had “more” (e.g. whether there were more red dots or 
blue dots), but also that they were roughly as good at doing 
this across modalities (e.g. vision to audition) as they were at 
matching intra-modal stimuli (e.g. the numerosities of two 
seen displays). Similar results are found in adults (Arrighi 
Togoli & Burr, 2014). In each case, the numerical ratio 
between sets continues to predict patterns of success and 
failure, further implicating a system with the performance 
profile of an ANS. 
Using a quite different paradigm, Franconeri, Bemis and 
Alvarez (2009) and He, Zhang, Zhou and Chen (2009) 
discovered additional evidence for an ANS. In their studies, 
subjects were presented with visual arrays containing sets of 
dots. What they showed was that connecting pairs of dots 
with a thin line (effectively turning pairs of dots into single 
dumbbell-shaped items) substantially reduces subjects’ 
intuitive estimates of numerosity. Franconeri et al. also 
showed that introducing a small break in the lines would 
immediately eliminate this “dumbbell effect”. Since displays 
with small breaks and displays with dots connected by thin 
lines differ only very slightly with respect to their total 
surface area, spatial frequency, and other non-numerical 
magnitudes, but dramatically with respect to their numerical 
quantity (displays of the former type contain twice as many 
items) these studies support the hypothesis that humans 
possess an operational ANS that provides a genuine 
sensitivity to number  itself.  
Finally, all of these results have been linked to findings 
at the level of neural implementation. Individual neurons in 
the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) respond selectively to specific 
numbers (Nieder, 2016). Thus, specific neurons in the IPS 
respond preferentially when one sees or hears an array or 
sequence containing (say) seven items, Crucially, this 
response profile is noisy. Thus, a neuron which is tuned to 7 
will fire when one observes 6 or 8 items and occasionally 
when one observes 5 or 9 items. Indeed, noise levels increase 
with number. As various theorists have observed, this is 
precisely what we would expect of neurons implementing an 
ANS, for it would seem to explain the system’s conformity 
to Weber’s Law. 
Recent Critiques 
The preceding remarks do not provide a comprehensive 
overview of work on the ANS. Nor do they definitively 
establish its existence. They merely provide readers with an 
initial sense of the vast, and seemingly convergent, evidence 
which speaks in favor of the ANS’s existence and capacity to 
represent number. With this in mind, we will now consider 
three arguments that have been levied against such proposals. 
For brevity, we will call these the arguments from 
Congruency, Confounds, and Imprecision. In showing that all 
three fail, we gain a deeper appreciation for why we really 
should posit an ANS which genuinely represents numbers. 
 
The Argument from Congruency 
An initial reason why some continue to doubt the existence 
of an ANS, with even broadly numerical content, stems from 
the existence of numerical congruency effects. These are 
cases in which numerical judgments are influenced by the 
perception of irrelevant magnitudes. For instance, when 
subjects compare Arabic numerals and decide which picks 
out a larger number, their reaction times are influenced by 
font size. So, when the larger numeral is printed in a larger 
font (a “congruent” trial) they answer more quickly than 
when the numerals are identical in font size (a “neutral” trial). 
And when the smaller numeral has a larger font (an 
“incongruent” trial), they’re slower and less accurate (Henik 
& Tzelgov 1982; Gebuis, Cohen Kadosh, de Haan & Henik, 
2009; Gebuis & Reynvoet 2012c). Similar effects occur in 
non-symbolic tasks. Thus, subjects who are tasked with 
determining whether one display of dots is more or less 
numerous than another are influenced in comparable ways by 
things like average dot diameter, dot density, convex hull, 
and dot brightness (Cohen Kadosh & Henik 2006; Dakin 
Tibber, Greenwood, Kingdom & Morgan, 2011; Gebuis & 
Reynvoet, 2012a, 2012b; Leibovich and Henik 2014).  
The argument from congruency proposes that these 
effects undermine the ANS hypothesis (Leibovich, Katzin, 
Harel & Henik, 2017; Gebuis, Cohen Kadosh & Gevers, 
2016). Here, it is claimed that if there were an ANS with 
genuine numerical content we would expect relevant 
numerical judgments to be based entirely on its outputs. In 
other words, continuous magnitudes should be ignored. But 
the existence of congruency effects shows that (often) they’re 
not, so the ANS hypothesis is problematic.  
Gebuis et al. (2016, p. 22) put the objection like this: if 
the relevant numerical judgments are influenced by the 
perception of non-numerical magnitudes then: 
why would there be an ANS system that can extract “pure 
numerosity”? What would be the use of having a system that 
can tell us exactly which cue at the passport control contains 
less [sic] people when it in the end adjusts this accurate answer 
in a possibly incorrect answer [sic] when for instance the length 
of the people in the cue [sic] is taken into account? 
From the perspective of optimal design, Gebuis et al. propose 
that it makes little sense for an ANS to exist if its outputs are 
influenced by confounding variables.  
An initial problem with this argument is that it 
overgeneralizes. It is well known that congruency effects 
affect our judgements of uncontroversially perceptible 
magnitudes. For instance, judgments of duration exhibit 
congruency effects on size (Lourenco & Longo, 2010), 
luminance (Xuan, Zhang, He & Chen, 2007), length 
(Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008), and distance (Sarrazin, 
Giraudo, Pailhous & Bootsma, 2004). So, if congruency 
effects demonstrate that numerical quantity isn’t represented 
in studies of the above sort, then by parity of reasoning they 
would demonstrate that magnitudes such as duration and 
distance aren’t perceptually represented either.  
To compound matters, congruency effects tend to be 
symmetric. For while numerical judgments are influenced by 
area and density, judgments of area and density are likewise 
influenced by number. Indeed, number appears to influence 
judgments of area and density more than vice-versa 
(Cicchini, Anobile & Burr, 2016). So, if the fact that 
numerical judgments are influenced by area and density 
shows that number isn’t represented by an ANS, there should 
be equal or greater evidence that area and density aren’t 
perceptually represented either. In this way, the argument 
from congruency leads to an implausible skepticism about the 
perceptual representation of magnitudes quite generally.  
These considerations suggest that the argument from 
congruency fails, but where exactly does it go wrong? We 
believe that the argument errs in assuming congruency effects 
are even in tension with the ANS hypothesis. If there is an 
ANS dedicated to representing number, the perception of 
continuous magnitudes might introduce biases at the initial 
encoding stage, influencing inputs to the ANS, or at the 
decision/response stages, altering outputs of the system. At 
the encoding stage, numerical and non-numerical magnitudes 
such as density may be computed on the basis of overlapping 
features, such as spatial frequency (Dakin et al. 2011) or 
object size (Dehaene & Changeux 1993). Thus, altering non-
numerical magnitudes might alter numerical judgments by 
altering features that are inputs to the ANS (Odic 2018). 
Alternatively, congruency effects might be a Stroop-like 
byproduct of competition for a single response. And given its 
scalar variability, the ANS is not a perfectly precise 
instrument. So, if it’s true that certain magnitudes typically 
correlate with number, it might make sense to adjust the 
outputs of the system in accord with those correlations. Thus, 
congruency effects might reflect an optimal strategy for 
counteracting the imprecision of the ANS.  
 
 
 
The Argument from Confounds 
The argument from congruency is unpersuasive. However, a 
related and comparatively troubling objection stems from the 
observation that numerical quantity is never presented 
independently of all confounding variables. For instance, a 
visual display containing nine dots will also contain dots with 
an average diameter, cumulative area, convex hull, and 
density. Similar points apply to heard or felt sets. 
Consequently, there is always the worry that number isn’t 
really being represented or tracked in studies of the above 
sort, only confounding variables. The objection from 
confounds claims that this undermines experimental attempts 
to evince an ANS with genuine numerical content (Leibovich 
& Henik 2013; Leibovich et al. 2017; Gebuis et al. 2016). 
There are actually two readings of this objection. On a 
strong reading, it is deemed impossible to empirically 
adjudicate the hypothesis that subjects represent numerical 
quantities (in addition to various sensory confounds) against 
the hypothesis that they merely represent sensory confounds. 
According to a weak reading of the objection it may not be 
impossible to empirically distinguish these hypotheses, but it 
is sufficiently difficult that there is, at present, no empirical 
justification to favor one hypothesis over the other – studies 
that have been conducted so far are, thus, equivocal. 
We see no reason to accept the argument in its stronger 
incarnation. Theories in science are always underdetermined 
by the data, and the selection of one theory over another 
requires an inference to the best explanation (Duhem, 1914). 
So, in psychology, there will never be a single experiment 
that eliminates all potential confounds. Instead, we must 
consider multiple studies that, cumulatively, support one 
hypothesis over the other. The postulation of an ANS with 
genuine numerical content is not special in this regard. For 
while number is an abstract property that cannot be observed 
in isolation, the same is true of many other properties which 
are plausibly represented by the pre-linguistic mind, such as 
causation (Kominsky & Carey, 2018) and animacy (Gergely 
& Csibra, 2003). In each case, these hypotheses are assessed 
against plausible alternatives, for to the extent that viable 
alternatives are ruled out in controlled experiments we can 
reasonably increase our faith in the relevant conjectures.  
This leaves the weaker reading of the objection. To 
appreciate its force, consider studies that examine our visual 
perception of number by presenting arrays of dots on a 
screen. Some such studies choose one potential confound – 
say, total surface area, and keep it constant while number 
varies. As Leibovich et al. (2017, p. 4) observe, this always 
leaves other continuous magnitudes uncontrolled for. For 
example, if the total surface area of the dots is kept constant 
while numerical quantity increases, then the average size of 
each dot will need to decrease. So, if subjects succeed in 
discriminating a difference, we don’t know if that’s because 
they’re tracking number or average dot-size.  
Other studies take turns varying non-numerical 
magnitudes across trials, such that no one confound correlates 
with number throughout the whole experiment. Thus, half the 
trials might keep total surface area constant while the other 
half keep average dot-size constant. Alternatively, each of a 
range of non-numerical magnitudes might be varied across 
trials such that, throughout the whole experiment, they are 
congruent on half of the trials and incongruent on the other 
half. But while these controls suggest that subjects do not rely 
on a single confounding magnitude, Gebuis et al. (2016, pp. 
23–24) object that subjects could still be switching between 
cues throughout the experiment or relying on multiple 
confounds (see also Leibovich et al. 2017, pp. 4-6).  
This may be possible, but in and of itself this fails to 
provide reasonable grounds for doubt. This is because a 
reasonable skepticism about the ANS cannot be ad hoc. It 
cannot rest on a piecemeal strategy of finding one set of 
continuous cues to account for behavior in one experiment, a 
second set of continuous cues to account for behavior in 
another experiment, and so on. What is needed is a positive 
proposal that explains how some particular function of 
continuous cues, or some principled strategy for switching 
among cues, could account for what appears to be number-
tracking behavior across a wide range of studies. Skeptics of 
the ANS have not provided one. Instead, they simply observe 
that numerical judgments are influenced by non-numerical 
magnitudes – that is, that they are subject to congruency 
effects. But as we have already seen, congruency effects are 
fully compatible with the existence of an ANS and fail to 
provide grounds for doubt. 
These points undermine the argument from confounds, 
indicating that it is theoretically undermotivated. But, before 
moving on, it is important to stress that empirical findings 
speak directly against the objection. Take the dumbbell 
effects discussed when introducing evidence for the ANS. 
There, we noted that connecting items with a thin line 
substantially reduces judgments of number, while 
introducing a small break in these lines eliminates this effect 
(Franconeri et al. 2009; He et al. 2009). Given that displays 
with and without a small break are nearly identical with 
respect to sensory confounds, but differ substantially in 
number, these studies indicate that number is itself tracked 
and represented and that performance doesn’t simply involve 
tracking non-numerical confounds. We have found no 
discussion of these studies by skeptics of the ANS.  
Additionally, some studies reveal that our sensitivity to 
number differs markedly from our sensitivity to non-
numerical magnitudes. For example, DeWind, Adams, Platt 
and Brannon (2015) compared how the number, size, and 
spacing of dots in a display affect numerical judgments and 
found that judgments were more sensitive to actual number 
than to size or spacing, suggesting that number itself is being 
tracked. (For a reply, see Leibovich et al. 2017, p. 10, and for 
a rebuttal to the reply see Park, DeWind & Brannon, 2017). 
Similarly, Cicchini et al. (2016) had subjects judge the area, 
density, and number of dots in a visual display, and found that 
number judgments were more sensitive than area and density 
judgments. Again, this suggests that subjects do not simply 
represent area and density, but also numerical quantity.  
Finally, we have already seen that cross-modal studies 
naturally eliminate potential confounds. For as was discussed 
when introducing evidence for the ANS, a static array of seen 
dots and a sequence of heard tones will seem to lack 
properties in common that could serve as a plausible crutch 
on which to base numerical comparisons. For while the dots 
will have a cumulative area, average diameter, and convex 
hull, the tones will have none of those properties. Since 
numerous cross-modal studies demonstrate success in 
numerical discrimination tasks, this further undermines the 
objection.  
Skeptics of the ANS do sometimes recognize this latter 
point. Leibovich et al. (2017) note that cross-modal studies 
provide “[a] very strong line of evidence supporting the 
ANS” (p. 5). But while they proceed to question whether 
cross-modal studies of newborns and infants show that the 
ANS is already operational at (or near) birth, we can bracket 
these worries here since we aren’t focused on the issue of 
innateness. The important point is that there are numerous 
cross-modal studies of adults (Barth, Kanwisher & Spelke, 
2003), preschoolers (Barth et al. 2005), and animals (Church 
and Meck 1984) that don’t face the same worries. In each 
case, these cross-modal comparisons display the distinctive 
performance profile of an ANS – discriminability in accord 
with Weber’s Law – thereby supporting the system’s 
existence.  
A more relevant critique for our purposes comes from 
Gebuis et al. (2016). They acknowledge the existence of 
studies in human adults demonstrating cross-modal 
adaptation (Arrighi et al., 2014) and cross-modal 
comparisons (Barth et al., 2003), but claim that such studies 
“do not present a clear result” (p. 27). They reason that if 
number is represented across modalities, there should be no 
cost to cross-modal comparison. But while the existence of 
some such cost remains a matter of dispute (contrast Barth et 
al., 2003, with Gebuis et al. 2016), its potential discovery 
should not alarm proponents of the ANS. In intra-modal 
tasks, numerical comparisons are probably facilitated by 
congruent continuous magnitudes while inter-modal tasks 
leave no such opportunity for facilitation. In any case, it is the 
fact that cross-modal numerical comparisons can be 
successfully executed at all that speaks in favor of an ANS 
with numerical content. So, while none of these studies are 
immune to criticism, they collectively constitute a 
compelling reply to the argument from confounds.  
 
The Argument from Imprecision  
The preceding remarks highlight empirical findings that are 
hard to make sense of without an ANS that affords genuine 
sensitivity to number. Nevertheless, a final argument – the 
argument from imprecision – raises a conceptual worry with 
this suggestion.  
Once again, this argument comes in two varieties. In its 
weaker incarnation, the argument states that the imprecision 
of the ANS’s numerical discriminations reveals that it cannot 
literally be representing the numbers that mathematicians 
recognize and discuss. At best, it can be representing 
numerosities, which are primitive analogs of number but not 
literally numbers themselves. In its stronger incarnation the 
argument purports to establish that the imprecision of the 
ANS prevents it from having any numerical content 
whatsoever – even primitive numerosity content. 
The stronger incarnation of the argument appears to be 
endorsed by Núñez (2017). He introduces his worry by noting 
that when the ANS discriminates numerical quantities its 
discriminations are “rarely exact” (p.417) – as we have seen, 
they are imprecise and conform to Weber’s Law. But as he 
sees it: 
A basic competence involving, say, the number ‘eight’, should 
require that the quantity is treated as being categorically 
different from ‘seven’, and not merely treated as often – or 
highly likely to be – different from it. (ibid.) 
In this way, Núñez proposes that the ascription of genuine 
numerical content to the ANS would require that it quantify 
“in an exact and discrete manner” lest this amount to nothing 
more than “loose” talk (p.418). Since this is something that 
the ANS does not do (to reiterate, its discriminations conform 
to Weber’s Law), Núñez proposes that the ANS does not 
represent numerical quantities at all. 
As we interpret him, Núñez is not merely proposing that 
the ANS is an approximate number system which represents 
imprecise or primitive analogs of number. He is denying that 
it produces any numerical content whatsoever. This is 
apparent in his “crucial distinction” between cognition that is 
genuinely “numerical” and cognition that it is merely 
“quantical” (a theoretical term Núñez introduces). Among 
other things, quantical cognition concerns “quantity-related 
capacities” that do not meet the requisite level of precision to 
qualify as genuinely numerical. Thus, Núñez argues that 
unless an ANS meets the requisite level of precision, it is 
inappropriate to suppose it could represent anything more 
than non-numerical quantities.  
In so doing, Núñez effectively lumps the ANS’s 
representations in with the representation of other 
magnitudes, such as duration, brightness, distance, and 
chemical concentrations. All of them are on a par. They are 
all “quantical.” But this obscures an important difference: 
numerical quantities are higher-order (Frege, 1884). Thus, 
numbers can only be assigned relative to a sortal—a criterion 
for individuating the entities that are being counted. The 
question, “How many things are in this room?” is ill-posed. 
The type of entity that’s being counted needs to be specified. 
When researchers study the ANS, they are investigating a 
system which tracks a property that is higher-order in this 
sense.   
To see why this matters, consider a recent study by 
Plotnik, Brubaker, Dale, Tiller, Mumby and Clayton (2019). 
Here, elephants were presented with pairs of buckets 
containing sunflower seeds. These had opaque, perforated 
lids, allowing elephants to smell (but not see) their contents. 
Plotnik et al. found that elephants would preferentially select 
the bucket containing a greater quantity of sunflower seeds, 
albeit imprecisely and in accord with Weber’s Law. On this 
basis, they took their results to corroborate studies that have 
been seen to indicate the existence of a numerical ANS in 
these creatures (e.g. Irie, Hiraiwa-Hasegawa & Kutsukake, 
2019). But note that while this might be so, it neglects a 
simpler possibility: that the elephants were merely sensitive 
to the intensity of the odor emanating from the buckets, 
leading them to approach the bucket with the stronger odor 
(and hence more seeds). On this account, Plotnik et al.’s 
findings would be orthogonal to the presence or absence of 
an ANS with genuine numerical content; they would simply 
provide further demonstration of these creatures’ formidable 
capacity for olfaction. 
Plotnik et al.’s study fails to distinguish between these 
possibilities. But it is a substantial question which is correct. 
And, it is a question we might wish to answer whether or not 
the relevant discriminations are intrinsically imprecise. This 
is because there is a basic distinction between a mere 
sensitivity to a non-numerical first-order magnitude such as 
odor, and an ability to abstract away from these to represent 
a higher-order numerical magnitude. Núñez’s approach 
obscures this important distinction, perhaps because he 
assumes that numerical magnitudes must be represented 
precisely. But just as first-order, non-numerical magnitudes 
can be represented precisely or imprecisely (you can 
represent someone’s height as “72 inches” or as 
“approximately the length of a sofa”) so too can higher-order 
numerical magnitudes (you can represent the number of coins 
in your pocket as “exactly five” or as “several”).  
Aware of this, and the fact that various studies would be 
hard to make sense of unless the ANS were genuinely 
tracking and representing numerical quantities, many 
theorists embrace a modest version of the argument from 
imprecision. They side with Núñez in thinking that the 
system’s imprecision precludes it from literally representing 
integers or other numbers that mathematicians typically 
recognize. But they maintain that this does not preclude it 
from representing numerical quantities of some variety. To 
this end, they introduce an intermediate category – 
“numerosity”. Numerosities are higher-order magnitudes but 
are intrinsically imprecise and indeterminate in a way that 
integers and other numbers of the sort discussed in the math 
class are not. Thus, proponents of the argument from 
imprecision, in its weaker variety, reject the suggestion that 
the ANS represents number (on account of its imprecision) 
but they allow that the system still represents imprecise 
numerosities of this sort. 
Interestingly, this position is often defended by theorists 
who are otherwise sympathetic to a number sense. For 
instance, Carey (2009, p. 295) writes that the ANS is "not 
powerful enough to represent the natural numbers" despite 
strongly advocating for the existence and workings of an 
ANS throughout the lifespan. Similarly, Spelke and Tsivikn 
(2001) claim that the ANS merely represents "a blur on the 
number line" given its imprecision, the suggestion being that 
rather than represent precise numbers, like integers, the ANS 
is representing an imprecise analog of these. Indeed, we 
suspect that most contemporary researchers working on the 
ANS implicitly accept a conclusion of this sort. Why else 
would they carefully avoid the term “number” in favor of the 
neologism “numerosity” when discussing the outputs of the 
system?   
Carey provides two arguments for the conclusion that the 
ANS represents numerosity rather than number. Neither 
succeeds. First, she notes that ANS representations "fail to 
capture small numerical differences between large sets of 
objects" (e.g. 58 vs. 59), the implication being that if the ANS 
were to represent these numbers it must be sensitive to these. 
This seems to be a mistake. The visual system fails to 
discriminate small differences between distances (e.g. 58 vs. 
59 meters), but it doesn't follow that it fails to represent 
distance. This is because, there is nothing problematic in the 
thought that a precise quantity (like a precise distance) might 
be represented imprecisely. As in the example above, 
someone’s height might be represented imprecisely as “about 
the length of my sofa”. There is no reason why the ANS, or 
its capacity to represent precise numbers, should be any 
different. To suggest otherwise is to mistake what the system 
is representing (e.g. precise integers) for how it represents 
this (e.g. precisely or imprecisely).  
Carey’s second argument moves beyond her first. She 
argues that because the ANS treats 5 and 6 as more similar 
than 4 and 5, it obscures the successor relation, and thus 
cannot represent precise numbers like the integers. Here, the 
suggestion is that a capacity to represent numbers, like the 
integers, ought to require a sensitivity to properties or 
features of these that are essential (or in some way central) to 
our conception of them (as the successor relation plausibly is 
with respect to number). But note, this is not true of the 
general case. Short of assuming an outdated and widely 
discredited descriptivism about mental content (which Carey 
would be at pains to reject) a capacity to represent some 
property does not require a sensitivity to any or all of its 
essential properties. So, while the successor relation is central 
(perhaps essential) to a mature grasp of number, a capacity to 
represent number (e.g. precise integers) does not depend on 
our capacity to represent this. 
To illustrate, note that without extensive training in 
chemistry, few would be able to distinguish genuine cases of 
gold from cases of fool’s gold. This is true despite essential 
differences in their chemical makeup. But it would be absurd 
to suppose that, for this reason, we are unable to represent 
and (e.g.) think about gold as such prior to gaining a 
chemistry degree. Indeed, the point applies to any given 
feature of the kind (Burge, 2010). So, in the same way that 
one can represent gold, despite an insensitivity to any specific 
differences between gold and other chemicals (e.g. fools’ 
gold), there is no reason why an ANS could not represent 
precise integers, like 7 or 8, despite an insensitivity to their 
precise categorical boundaries or successive relationship.  
Of course, even if Carey’s arguments don’t succeed, that 
doesn’t show that the ANS represents number rather than 
numerosity. But we think that this should be the default view 
for two reasons. First, it avoids the awkward question of what 
a numerosity is. This is a good thing since so far as we can 
tell no one really has any idea.  
Second, positing that the ANS genuinely represents 
number allows us to avoid a curious double standard that has 
plagued discussions of the ANS. To appreciate this, note that 
positing genuine number representations allows for greater 
consistency with our treatment of non-numerical magnitudes. 
For instance: we have already noted that perceptual 
representations of distance are imprecise, but we have not 
come across a single passage which concludes that we 
thereby represent “distancosity” as opposed to distance. So, 
pending a convincing argument to the contrary, it is natural 
to hold on to the hypothesis that humans possess an ANS that 
genuinely represents numbers. 
  
Conclusion 
This paper has considered a now orthodox view according to 
which humans have an approximate number system (ANS), 
that represents number. This orthodox view has faced 
resistance in the form of three objections – the arguments 
from congruency, confounds and imprecision. But, upon 
close inspection, none are persuasive. To compound matters, 
there are reasons to hold onto the suggestion that the ANS 
genuinely represents numbers, pending a convincing 
argument to the contrary. So, as things stand, proponents of 
the orthodox view have nothing to fear from recent critiques 
of their position. 
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